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SUMMARY
This study examines the impact of social security on the
retirement of married men aged 60-70 years. The empirical results
are based on a rich file of data from the Social Security Adminis-
tration (1973 CPS-IRS-SSA Exact Match File). The data permit precise
calculation of social security wealth (the actuarial present value
of benefits that a person would receive by retiring) denoted SSW.
This variable measures social security's effect on retirement. The
estimated effects are significant and considerable. When SSW in-
creases from $35,000 to $55,000 the probability of retirement rises
by .15 for 62-64 year olds relative to a .41 retirement rate. For
65-70 year olds this increase is .22 relative to .78. For 60-61
year olds who ae entitled to SSW but not old enough to receive
benefits the estimated effect was small and insignificant. This
supports the conclusion that the observed effect on men eligible
for benefits is a causal relationship.
The traditional method of comparing market and reservation
wages for analyzing the decision to work provides the basic econom-
ometric model. SSW is added to construct a retirement model. A
two-step probit analysis is developed to identify structural para-
meters in the retirement model.
Anthony J. Pellechio




The Effect of Social Security on Retiretnent*
The social security program is the major source of incomesup-
port for retired workers.' The basic idea of this program is to di-
rect benefits to individuals whose retirement decreased their income
and was outside their control. A provision consistent with this idea
is the retirement test which reduces social security benefits when
earned income exceeds a certain amount.2 However, the variation in
benefit levels for individuals who otherwise face the same economic
opportunities in terms of their market wage, capital income, and
other resources may influence the decision to retire. Also, the
high implicit tax rate on earnings above an exempt amount can change
the labor supply of persons who are eligible for retirement benefits
subject to the earnings test. Therefore, rather than being outside
individual control, retirement may be induced by social security.
The net effect of social security on total income which is the sum
of labor, benefit, and capital income is an unanswered empirical
question because we do not know enough about its impact on retire—
3
merit.
This paper examines how social security affects retirement in
a cross—section sample of men aged 60—70 years. The data source
comes from the Social Security Administration and contains accurate
information on the retirement benefits which eachperson is eligible
to receive, regardless of whether he claims these benefits as a re-
tiree. The foundation of this analysis is the standard theory of
labor—leisure choice. Section II will briefly review recent liter—
*The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
j social insurance. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.2
ature on social security and retirement behavior.The retirement
model based on a market wage equation and
shadow price equation is
introduced in Section III. These twoequations are part of a simul-
taneous equations mode]. of labor supply whichwill be discussed
briefly. The data source and specification of themodel are pre-
sented in Section IV. Empirical results basedon estimating the
participation model over subsa.mples of 60—70year old men constitute
Section V. Section VI briefly summarizes andconcludes this paper.
II. Review of Recent Literature
The Social Security Administration hasconducted several sur-
veys of beneficiaries almost since benefits were first paid in
l940.Early survey results seemed to indicate thatpoor health and
lack of employment opportunities weremajor reasons for the retire-
ment of respondents. As Quinn (1975) pointsout, health may be a
more convenient or socially acceptable explanation fordeparture from
full—time work than personal economic gain. He showsthat health,
labor market conditions, and job characteristicsdo influence retire-
ment, but economic factors have additional explanatorypower in his
retirement model. The main economic determinantsare eligibility for
social security and private pension retirement benefitsand interac-
tion between the two. The insignificantwage effect found by Quinn
maybecaused by hIs not having the full benefit amount whichan in-
dividual is entitled to receive. Since thisamount is expected to
have a negative income effect onparticipation and be positively3
correlated with the wage, the wage effect which shouldbe positive may
be estimated as small and insignificant dueto left—out variable bias.
Another difficulty with these results is notbeing able to distinguish
between the effect of eligibility for benefits anddeclining participa-
tion due to age. Although there are problems, Quinn'sresults provide
empirical support for viewing retirement as an economic decision.
Boskin (1977) constructs a model which enables himto estimate
responses to both social security benefits and the earnings test in
the transition to retirement status. Since his resultsare based on
defining retirement as working less than quarter time, it isnot clear
how much of the effect he measures is just due to whetheror not a
person worksatall. Analyzing labor force participationseparately
fromthe amount of labor supplied after aperson decides to work is
important for two reasons: (1) it indicates whether the information
inlabor supply estimates comes from participationor variation in
positive amounts of work; (2) participation analysis is notcompli-
cated by the earnings test which makes the budget line kinked andnon—
convex (discussed in Section III). A better understanding of howso-
cial security affects retirement is obtained byseparating the benefit
effect on participation and the combined effect of benefits and the
earnings test on labor supply. Boskin also does not have data on in—
dividuaj.s' full retirement benefits and is forced touseimputed
benefits based on an earnings regression and the benefits formula
or actual benefits received if present. Withstanding these4
problems, Boskin makes a significant contribution by analyzing retire-
ment in the context of states of labor market activity andoffering a
specification for examining this dynamic process.
The earnings distribution of persons eligible for benefitsis a
source of evidence that retirement may be induced by socialsecurity.
A clustering of earned income around the amount above whichbenefits
are reduced for increases in earnings would indicate some distortion
of labor supply. Evidence of this clustering effect has beenpre-
sented by Social Security Administration (SSA) researchers Sander
(1968) and Vroman (1971). They conclude that retirees do control
their earnings so that benefits are not withheld by theearnings
test. This is evidence that social security has an effect on labor
supply conditional on participation but it does not indicate whether
participation is itself affected by benefits. There have been dif-
ferences in the retirement research done by the SSA and economists
outside the SSA as discussed by Campbell and Campbell (1976), but
recent results by both reveal some aspects of induced retirement.
SSA researchers (e.g., Bixby, 1976) stress, as doCampbell and
Campbell, the importance of finding and estimating work disincen-
tives that operate against social security's objective of income
maintenance for the aged.
Estimating the effect of social security on the probability of
retirement is the focus of this study. Having an accuratemeasure of
the potential benefit a person is entitled to receive is the main5
advantage of the data used here. -The decision to work, thefirst
step in the labor supply process, of potential retireescovered by
social security comes under investigationas a useful empirical study
on its own and as part of the important study of life—cyclelabor
supply.
III. The Retirement Model
A person decides to work based on theopportunities available
inside and outside the market. This decision is embeddedin the
process of personal welfare maximization which can include humancap-
ital accumulation and bequest motives. Thisstudy analyzes labor
force participation in a givenyear of retirement—aged men whose
education and training are, for practicalpurposes, completed. In
this context, a person's wage is a fixed marketvaluation of his
working time. Whether a person works depends on the value oftime
spent in nonmarket activity as veil. The value of time fornon—
workers, their reservation wage, is larger than their marketwage.
When a person's reservationwage is less than the market wage and he
can work any desired amount, then he supplies labor ata level which
equates his shadow price of time and the marketwage. The comparison
of a market wage and reservationwage is the foundation of the retire-
ment model used here. This approach is developed in theliterature
by Cronau (1973), Hall (1973, 1975), Hanoch (1976a,b), and Heckman
(1974, 1977).6
The market wage (w) that an individual,faces will depend on a
set of observed variables (X) and anerror term (e1) which includes
unobserved and unobservable determinants ofwage opportunities, other
left—out variables, and a random disturbance.The market wage rela—
tionsh.ip is specified in the followingsemi—log form:
(1) lnv Xa±e1
This form of the wage equation iswidely accepted in the econometrics 5 literature.
Labor market activity also depends on theshadow price (s) of a
person's time, which will be influencedby a set of variables (Y) and
the amount of time spent working (K).Unobserved labor supply deter—
ininants andarandom disturbance will be combined inan error term
(e2). The form of the shadow price equation is the sameas eq. (1):
(2) insY8+yK+e2.
In the static labor force participationmodel, when market wage is
less than shadow price at zero laborsupply, i.e., s(K=O) >w,the
individual will not participate in labor marketactivity; if s(KO) <
w,then the individual will participate.
As discussed by Pellechjo (1978), fullretirement is a dynamic
life—cycle decision. The analysis of this decisionrequires adding
the present value of future retirementbenefits assuming full retire—
sent to the set of explanatoi-y variables in thestatic labor force7
participation model. In this study, social securitywealth, SSW, as
defined by Feldstein (1976) and Feldstein andPellechio (l977a, b),
is the relevant present value. Consequently,using eqs. (1) and (2)









6SSW + Xci —Y,and DP be a qualitative van—
able indicating participation (DP =1)or retirement (DP0). From
eq. (3) the probability of participation, P(DP1), can be written
as:
P(DP 1) P(e0 <
2 2 If e1 and e2 are normally distributed with variance and °2' re-








where F is the standard normal distribution function
and J0 I0/c,
the participation index. Since the variables thatare used to de-
termine wage andshadowprice appear in J0, estimates of the coeff i—8
cients in eqá. (1) and (2) andup to scale factor a may be obtained
from a probit analysis of DP. If a variable is in bothX and Y,
i.e., it influences both market wage and shadow price,only the dif-
ference between its coefficients ineqs. (1) and (2) relative to
can be identified. Thus, a probit analysis of DP based oneqs. (1)
and (2) estimates the net effect on participation of thevariables
in these equations.
Having the true wage, w*, that each person faces in the market
would permit estimating coefficients in the shadow priceequation.
In this case, individuals work when:
e2 <SSW+ ln w*
so that
P(DP1) =F[(SSSW+ in w —
Y$)/a2]
The inverse of the estimated coefficient on in w yieldsan estimate
of a2, a2. The estimated coefficients for the Y variables and SSW
are multiplied by a2 to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the
8's and 6.
In this study, estimates of the a's, 8's, and 6are obtained by
estimating the wage equation over the sample of working persons and
using imputed wages, w, in a second probit step. Itmay be desirable
to use imputed wages rather than observed wages due to transitory
disturbance or measurement error In reported earnings and laborsupply9
of workers (Hall, 1973). Since participation defines thesample for
market wage estimation,e1 can be related to the X's through eq. (3)
so that OLS estimates ofmaybebiased. Hanoch (1976b) andHeckman
(1977) show that an additional variable must be includedto correct
for sample selection bias. This can be seen bytaking the expectation
of in w conditional on participation:
(5) E(in wJX, DP 1) X +E(e1IX,DP 1)
From the participation analysis the conditionalmean of e1 is:
(6) E(e1IX, DP1) —
E(e11e0
<I)
Evaluating this expression yields the following:
0f(J)





— andfis the standard normal density
function. Thus, the wage regression function conditionalon partici-
pation is:
r0—ol f(J)
(8) E(lnvIX, DP l)—X +1012JF(J L0J 0
The additional variable that corrects forsample selection bias is
f(30)/F(J0) which is the inverse of Mill's ratio andisabbreviated
M(30). Using the estimates of u/a0, and 6/0ofromthe probit10
analysis of DP [eq. (4)], an estimate ofM(J0) is constructed for
each individual. The wage equation is estimatedover the sample of
workers where wages are observed with the estimate ofMCJ0) added to
the right—hand side. It is important to note that the Yvariables
which are not in X are nonetheless included in thewage regression to
avoid inducing bias in their coefficient estimates in the secondpro—
bit step. Using the coefficient estimates, awage is imputed to
workers and nonworkers.
The error (ei) in using imputed rather than truewages enters
the analysis as dide1 [in eq. (3)] when using the market wage equa-
tion. Therefore, people work when:
e2— e <SSW+lnw—y8
Letting = — 2aa2+ o, the participation probability becomes:
(9) P(DP=1)=F[(5SSW+ mw —Y8)/
Theestimatesof coefficients for in w, Y, and SSW can be used as in
the case when true wages are knowntoestimate BandtS.7
A labor supply equation follows from eqs. (1) and (2) bysetting
in w in s and solving for K conditional on participation.8 If this
strict derivation is not assumed an independent equation for K can be
added to eqs. (1) and (2) which would complete the labor supply
model. In this way the variables which determine, participation do11
not also strictly determine the amount of work.Consequently, the
labor supply decision is viewed as atwo—step process. In the first
step, given a set of variables describing opportunities formarket and
nonmarket activity, it is decided whetheror not to participate in the
labor market. If the decision is fornonparticipation, then labor
supply is naturally zero. However, conditionalon deciding to work,
the same variables with different coefficientsor additional variables
may determine how much to work in the second step of thesupply de-
cision. This study examines empirically theparticipation decision,
the first step in the labor supplyprocess, for retirement—aged men.
Up to this point, the del assumes that thewage rate is not
changed by the earnings test. The earnings test that will becon-
sidered operates as follows: there is no loss inbenefits for earn-
ings up to an exempt amount of $1 in benefits is lost forevery
$2 of earnings up to $M2; benefits are lostdollar—for—dollar with
earnings up to the point where the person receives no benefit income
and the budget line returns to what it would beoutside the retirement
program. The earnings—tested budget line of a person withwage w who
could receive full benefit amount F..B is illustratedin Figure 1.
A crucial feature of this budget set forparticipation analysis
is that the extension of its initialsegment BC (shown as the dashed
line CC) lies above the budget constraint.Although the earnings—
tested budget constraint is nonlinear andnonconvex, it never Cuts







Fig. 1. The Earnings—Tested Budget Line
12
The earnings test provides that no benefitsare withheld from
workers earning less thanM1 a year, $1 in annual benefits are withheld
for each $2 in annual earnings betweenN1 and N2, and $1 was withheld













wage and shadow price comparison at zero labor supply that underlies
the participation analysis would not be valid.It would be possible
for shadow price to be less than or equal to theslope along a seg—
ment which was above CC, indicating a potentialpositive amount of
work, even though shadow price was greater thanwage at zero labor
supply. Fortunately no such problem arises with theearnings test.
The conventional assumption made here that individualsface a
fixed wage may not describe how the marketactually works. If wages
rise with the amount of labor supplied, theresulting nonconvex
budget line may cause problems. On the other hand,progressive in-
come taxation diminishes the likelihood that a wage—hours locuswill
affect the analysis. There is the related issue thatindividuals
may not be able to choose their amount of work freely and face
discrete choices for part—time and full—time work.Thus, the work
and nonwork dichotomy might be replaced bya trichotomy: full—time
work, part—time work, and no work. Although the analysiscan be ex-
tended to cover these and other descriptions of workchoice, the ap-
proach taken here is less complicated than these others and isa
good starting point.
IV.Dataand Model Specification
The empirical analysis is based on a rich file of data from
the Social Security Administration, the 1973 cPS—IRS—SSAExact Match
file.9 This filestarts with the March 1973 Current Population
Survey (CPS) from which selected information on each individual has14
been taken. This information has been linked withextracts of Social
Security Administration (SSA) records for each individual. TheSSA
data permit precise calculation of full socialsecurity retirement
benefits. The amount of a monthly benefit award isrelated to past
earnings. Benefits are determined by first computingan insured
worker's average monthly earnings. This is doneby suing a
worker's covered earnings after 1950omitting five years of lowest
earnings and dividing the accumulated amount by the number of months
during the same period; this average is denoted AME5O. A formula
stated in the law relates ANE5O to the monthly benefitpayable to an
insured worker alone——this is the primary insuranceamount, PIA.
Benefits for a dependent spouse are 50percent of the primary worker's
PIA. A married couple will receive at least 150percent of the pri-
mary worker's PI.A. If the secondary, worker's PIA is greater than 50
percent of the primary worker's, a retired couple will receive the
sum of their separate PIA's. Actuarial reduction of full benefits
payable to workers and spouses aged 62—64years is applied according
to the law. The potential benefit payable toa couple is denoted
'BHW.
Social security wealth, SSW, as defined in Feldstein (1976)
and Peldstein and Pellechio (1977a, b), is basedon the husband's and
wife's respective PI.A's. A couple's SSW is the actuarialpresent
value of the husband's PI.A and one of thefollowing:
1) the dependent wife's allowance of 50percent of her hus—
band's PIA while he is alive and the survivor's benefits15
of •82.5 percent contingent on his death whenher PIA is
less than 50 percent of his
2) the wife's PIA while the husband is aliveand the survivor's
benefit when her PIA is greater than 50percent of his but
less than 82.5 percent
3) the wife's PIA alone if it isgreater than the survivor's
benefit
The present value was calculated at several realdiscount rates. The
SSW variable used here was based on a real discountrate of 3percent.
The size of the coefficient estimate for SSWvaries directly with the
discount rate, but other results do not change.
An individual's initial endowment of wealth andunexpected
changes in wealth can influence life—cycle behavior. On theother
hand, savings and realized capital income arise froman optimal plan
that redistributes consumption and leisureover time. Therefore,
capital income should have no independent influenceon any one per-
iod's consumption or labor supply.Unfortunately the data contain
no direct measure of endowed or accumulated wealthor capital gains
or losses over time. The CPS income informationreports property
income as the sum of interestpayments, dividends and rental income,
and other income. The IRS data give theamount of total dividends
and the taxable portion of interest receivedby an individual from
bonds, debentures, notes, mortgages, personal loans, bankdeposits,
and savings accounts. The larger amount incapital income reported16
from the CPS and IRSisdenoted KINC. Results will be presented in-
cluding capital income In the model even though it should not have
an independent effect on life—cycle labor supply. Anargument can
be made that capital income may capture the effect of initialendow-
ments or unexpected capital gains or losses and therefore should be
in the model. KINC enters the model through the shadowprice equa-
tion. It is important to note that the results remainunchanged
when KINC is excluded (as will be shown in Appendix B).
The SSA information also containssummary measures of a per-
son's recent earnings experience. Average monthlyearnings based
on the five years of highest earnings serves as an indicator ofa
person's potential market wage. This Is multiplied by 12 toyield
average yearly earnings, AYE, which is used as an explanatory van—
able In the wage equation. This is done because the SSAuses nominal
earnings in each year for computing the AME's without adjusting for
wage growth or price inflation. Therefore, assuming that nominal
earnings grow, AYE is an average of five recent yearly wages. A
problem with AYE is that only annual amounts up to the maximum
taxable earnings under the law in each year are used)0 Thistrun-
cation on earnings introduces a downward bias In AYE asa yearly
wage estimate. However, the SSA describes a person's pattern of
employment and from this description a binary variable, MAX, is set
equal to 1 when a person always earned the maximum taxable amount
and 0 otherwise. Putting MAX Into the wage regressionyields an17
estimate of the percentage increase inwages for persons who always
earn the maximum or more. The equation used here topredict wages
is not the traditional wage equation in thesense that wage is gen-
erated by schooling, experience, and background variablesas devel-
oped by Griliches (1977), Gronau (1973), Mincer (1974), and Chamber-
lain (1975, 1977). Rather laggedwages measured by AYE and MA) serve
as predictors of current wage along with other variables from the
traditional model which will be used also.
Variables that influence both marketwage and shadow price are
the number of years of schooling (SCHOOL) andbinary variables for
race (RACE1 for whites), residence in a ruralarea (RURAL), and
age (DAGE1 for persons whose age equals ACE). Residence in the
South (SOUTH) is an additional binary variable in thewage equation.
The age that a person attains in 1972 is usedas his observed
age. Month of birth is given in the data. The number of weeks that
a person works is given in categories which are 1—13, 14—26,27—39,
40—48, 49—52 weeks. The number of weeks worked isapproximated by
the m.idpoint of the category in which aperson falls. Most people
who work are in the 49—52 weeks category (seeAppendix C) so the mid-
point approximation does not pose any significant problem. Aperson
is said to have retired when weeks worked in 1972 endbefore his
month of birth. In other words, retirement status is definedby
stopping work before reaching one's next year of age in 1972. A
fortiori, this includes persons who retired before 1972. The natural
assumption is that retirement is planned around the timea specific18
age is attained. Therefore, the participation modeldiscussed in
Section III becomes a retirement model whenDP —1for working Into
or beyond one's month of birth.
Actuarial reduction of benefits iscomputed to the month of re-
tirement. If a person underage 65 worked, actuarial reduction is
based on the number of months between thelast month of work and the
month and year in which a person attainsage 65.
The actual number of hours aperson worked during the week be-
fore the March 1973 CPS is given. Thisobservation on hours per week
Is multiplied by weeks worked in 1972to yield an estimate of annual
hours worked in 1972 for the sample of full—timeworkers. Observed
wages are obtained for this sample when their 1972earnings are di-
vided by annual hours. Thewage equation is estimated over the sam-
ple of full—time workers and the log ofwage, LWAGE, is the left—hand
side variable. If a person workedon a full—time basis in 1972 but
hours worked were not reported for thesurvey week, the value for
hours per week was set at 40. Thisattempts to avoid survey—week
selectivity bias as defined and discussed by Eanoch (1976b).
The entire sample under study consists ofmarried men aged
60—70 years whose CPS, SSA, and IRS recordsare properly matched.
These men are insured under OASI, not coveredby the railroad retire-
ment .system, and not employed by the federalor a state government.
This was done so that responses to socialsecurity would not be con-
fused with the effects of other pensionprograms. Also, the persons19
in the sample did not receive welfare income,unemployment compensa-
tion, or disability payments. In this way, income maintenancepro-
grams other than social security do not influence the behavior under
study.
Wage, schooling, and age of wives may influence husbands'
shadow price of time. These variables are added to the shadowprice
equation and are denoted LWAGEW, SCHOOLW, and AGEW, respectively.
Given the variables defined in this section, theequations
discussed generally in Section III can be specified. The market
wage equation is:
(1') LWAGE a + a AYE + a MAX + a SCHOOL + a SOUTH
0 1 2 3 k
5 6 1
The shadow price equation is:
(2')lnS8+8KINC+8ScHOOL+8RUPL+8CE
o 1 3 5 6
+ 8 AGEW + B LWAGEW + B SCHOOLW + bDAGE + e
7 8 9 2
Since shadow price is not observed, eq. (2') cannot be estimated
directly. The two—step probit analysis presented in Section III
provides an indirect method for estimating the B's.
Although SSW is not an explanatory variable in thewage or
shadow price equations, It enters the delthrough Its influence
on lifetime resources and net wage, as discussed In PellechioJ
20
(1978). Letting k be the rate of accumulating SSW andt be the tax
rate implicit in the earnings test at the margin ofjust working and
earning some income, the shadow price and netwage comparison under-
lying the retirement decision can be expressed as:
s >w[1+ SSW (k+ t)]
By taking the log of this equation, SSW can enter the modelseparately.
Even though a tore precise specification forincluding SSW can be de-
rived, simply adding SSW as a separate variable in theparticipation
index [see Section III, eqs. (3) and (4)] is in thespirit of using a
linear specification as a first approximation to the model'sfunction-
al form.
The variables used in the retirement modelare listed and sum-
marized in Table 1. The effect of SSW on retirement is themain
focus of study.21
TABLE1
LIST AND SUfARY DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Abbreviation Description
OP equals 0forhaving retired when retirement is defined
bystopping work before reaching one's next year of
age in 1972; equals 1 for not having retired
AYE average yearly earnings based on five years of
highestearnings
MA.X equals 1 for persons always earning the maximmi
taxable amount under social security law; 0 otherwise
BHW full potential social security benefit payableto a
married couple
SSW actuarial present value of benefits (including
wives' survivors benefits) assuming full retirement
KINC capital income
SCHOOL years of schooling
SOUTH equals 1forresidence in the South; 0 otherwise
RURAL equals1forresidence in a rural area; 0 otherwise
RACE equals 1forwhites; 0otherwise
LWAGE log of observed wage for workers
ACEW age of wife
LWAGEW log of observed wage for working wives
ScaOoLw wife'syears of schooling
DAGE binary variablesfor age:
D601 for 61 year olds in the 60—61agegroup
D63 " 63 "
62—64
D64 64 '
D66 " 66 " 65—70 "
D67 " 67 "




This section presents estimated retirement models for various
age groups in the full sample of married men aged 60—70 years. The
sample is divided into age groups based on prior considerations for
which support can be found in the empirical results. To begin,
there is a technical reason for estimating the model inseparate age
groups when the observed proportion of those who retire rises with
age. A "different" equation may be required to approximate these
changing retirement probabilities; the equation is "different" in
the sense that its coefficients change in differentage groups.
The first step in estimating the model is a probit analysis
of retirement based on the variables in eqs. (1') and (2') and SSW.
SSW is included because retirement is a dynamic decision in the life—
cycle model. This requires adding the capital value of social se-
curity benefits that will be received during full retirement. The
behavior of individuals in the 62—64 year old agegroup can illus-
trate the importance of the life—cycle approach. These individuals
are eligible for benefits subject to actuarial reduction for early
retirement. If this reduction is fair to an individual, there is no
incentive to retire early and accept a reduced benefit If retirement
Is financed from private assets and social security. If aperson
wants to retire early, he can wait for his full benefit and finance
early retirement from private assets with no loss In capital value
of total resources. Therefore, there is no incentive to collect
benefits early in a life—cycle model of behavior.23
Social security can raise lifetimeresources by yielding a
higher—than—market rate of return arid theresulting wealth effect
could induce early retirement. Higher SSWmay obviate private
financing of this retirement. For menage 60—70 in 1972 who did not
pay social security taxes over their whole working lives, their
lifetime resources are likely to have been increasedby the insti-
tution and gradual growth of social security.Thus, actuarial reduc-
tion would only mitigate the overall wealth effect inthe sample
under study here. This wealth effect could lowerlabor supply in all
periods of life. However, due to institutionalconstraints, it may
be difficult to lower hours workedper week or weeks worked per year
during full—time working years. If this is thecase, the relevant
margin for reducing lifetime labor supply is the timing of retirement.
Consequently, social security may induce early retirementthrough a
constrained wealth effect. The coefficient for SSW in theretirement
model measures a partial or full wealth effecton labor supply work-
ing through the retirement decision.
The opportunity to avoid actuarial reduction andaccumulate ad—
ditional benefit credits through earningsas discussed in Pellechio
(1978) provides an argument for observing SSWact as an incentive not
to retire between ages 62 and 64. Holdingwage constant, higher
social security wealth might imply a higher rate ofreturn from social'
security. In this way, social security acts as a netwage subsidy.
However it is not likely that significant increasesin the present
value of benefits can be gained forworking between ages 62 and 65,24
especially since the 1972 legislation changed the computation of the
benefits base (AME5O, see Section IV) to coverearnings in years to
age 62 back from age 65.It is important to add that the earnings
test applied in the social security program reduces benefitsonly
after earnings exceed a certain amount. Consequently, atzero labor
Supply the marginal tax rate of the earnings test is zero. Therefore,
the reduction in benefits due to the earnings test shouldnot be
responsible for early retirement effects observed in the estimates of
the retirement model.
Actuarial reduction was the mainreasonfor estimating the model
separately for 62—64 year olds. The estimated coefficient for SSW
should be interpreted as measuring the net impact of the effectsdis-
cussed above. Subsequent refinements in specifying the model and de-
fining the variables may permit estimating the wealth, accumulation,
and substitution effects separately (see Pellechio, 1978).
Persons aged 60—61 years are not eligible to receive benefits,
but an accurate potential benefit can be computed from theiraverage
monthly earnings nonetheless and SSW can be calculated from these
benefits. However there should be no explanatorypower associated
with benefits that cannot be received. Thus theseineligible persons
serve as a control group——if social security does influence their
labor force participation, then there is correlation withoutcausality
in the estimates.25
Persons. aged 65 and over are eligible to receive their full
benefits. If they postpone retirement, benefits are increasedby
only 1 percent annually. Such a low benefit increase for working
beyond age 65 would encourage retiring because delaying retirement
lowers the present value of benefits at a market rate of interest
greater than 1 percent. Therefore, at least in the over-65 age
group, higher SSW should induce retirement since the higher is SSW,
the greater the loss from postponing retirement.
Table 2 presents probit estimates of the retirement model
based on eqs. (1') and (2') and SSW over the threeage groups dis-
cussed above. For each variable in these equations andSSW, the
estimated value of its coefficient in the participationindex,
discussed in Section III, is given.
For 60—61 year olds, the coefficient estimate for SSW is small
and insignificant compared to those in the otherage groups. Since
60—61 year olds are not eligible for retirementbenefits, social
security should not affect their retirement and the supporting em-
pirical evidence is encouraging. The life—cycle model doessuggest
that raising lifetime resources through SSW couldchange desired
labor supply in all periods. Thus, beingineligible to receive bene—
fits does not entirely preclude SSW's having an effecton labor sup-
ply. However, as mentioned, institutional workarrangements may not
allow individuals to adjust their labor supply in allperiods to
desired levels. The timing of retirementmay be where changes in
lifetime labor supply in response to socialsecurity occur. SinceTABLE 2
PROBIT ANALYSIS± OF R.ETIRENT
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•Th results were obtained from the MaximumLikelihoodProbit
Estimation Progran written by Forrest Nelson and RichardRosett,
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*DAGE Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors):
Ages 60—61: D610.078(0.127)
Ages 62—64: D63 —0.124 (0.126) D64 —0.213 (0.126)
ages 65—70: D66 —0.085 (0.139) D67 —0.101 (0.146)
68 —0.208 (0.155) D69 —0.058 (0.159)
D70 —0.018 (0.170)28
it is still a period ofaccumulating SSW for 60—61 year olds, an in—
significant, small coefficient estimate for SSW couldresult from the
wealth effect being offset'by the incentiveto work and gain credit
for higher future benefits. However thewealth effect should be
dominant for 61—61 year olds who paidnothing into the social secur-
ity program before it was established and littleduring its early
stages, but obtained full coverage. Evidence thatsocialsecurity
has no effect on the labor forceparticipation of persons ineligible
to receive benefits indicates that its observedsignificant effect
on the retirement behavior of eligiblepersons is a causal relation-
ship.
In the 60—61 year old sample, theonly variable having a sig-
nificant effect on work is MAX, indicating thata person who always
worked and earned the maximum taxableamount is likely to continue
working. Permanent unobserved determinants of laborsupply may in-
duce a positive correlation between labor forceparticipation before
and after the observed period [Hall (1975)discusses this in the
context of the negative income tax experiments). Inaddition to
measuring a wage effect, MAX may also be serving asa serial corre—
lation variable controlling for unobservedlabor supply determinants.
The transition from actuarially reducedto full benefits in—
creases social security's effect on retirement. Therate of accumu-
lating SSW is reduced by moving out of therange In which benefits
are actuarially increased for later retirement and into theperiod29
for receiving full benefits where delaying retirement increases
benefits by an insignificant amount. Consequently,postponing re-
tirement decreases SSW and the larger is SS', thegreater is the cap-
ital loss. Such losses are avoided by retiring.
The quantitative impact of the variables in Table 2on retire—
merit is not inediately apparent from the coefficient estimatesre-
ported there. The estimated probability of labor forceparticipation,
or, in other words, of not being retired, is:
J
(10) P(DP 1) 1f(t)dt
-
where is the participation index discussed in Section III andes-
timated in Table 2, and f is the standard normal density function.
It follows that:
(11) f(J )b0 x
where x is any variable in J arid b is x'scoefficientestimate in 0 x
(these coefficient estimates are given in Table 2). Forexample,
when x is SCHOOL, bSCHOOL is the estimate of(a3 —cx3)/a0
.Ascan
be seen, the effect of one variable depends on the net result ofits
influence on market wage and shadow price and the values for all the
other variables through f(J0). Using the example ofa white married
male aged 62 years with twelve years of schooling who resides neither
in the South nor a rural area with a nonworking wife of thesame age
and education and has values of AYE and KINC equal to theirmean30
values for 62—64 year olds, the point estimate of —0.174 for SSW in-
dicates that a $10,000 increase in social security wealth centeredon
its mean value of $46,016 raises the probability of retirementby
0.05. For the same male aged 65 years, SSW's point estimate of —0.255
raises the retirement probability by 0.08 for the same $10,000 in-
crease around a mean value of $46,115. This provides some quantita-
tive reference point for the estimates in Table 2.
By estimating the wage equation arid using imputed wages in the
second probit step, the wage effect is summarized in a single coeffi-
cient. When this is done, estimated probabilities of retirement by
wage, and benefit amounts can be calculated. Regressing observed
wages in the sample of full—time workers on all variables in the re-
tirement model is the intermediate step in the analysis. The coeffi-
cient estimates in Table 2 are used to constructM(J0), an estimate of
the inverse of Mill's ratio discussed in Section III. This variable
is added to the wage regression to correct potential bias in coeff i—
cient estimates induced by selecting the sample of full—time workers.
This does not imply that the first probit analysis produced biased
estimates; it was carried out over the full sample so there is no
selectivity problem. Since the intermediate step is not the focus
of study, estimated wage equations for the three agegroups are pre-
sented arid discussed in Appendix A.
In the first probit step, the wage effect is dispersed through
the variables in eq. (1'). By using imputed wages in the secondpro—
bit step, three things are accomplished:3].
1) the wage effect is measured by the coefficientestimate for
imputed wage, or, in other words, the dispersedwage effect
in the reduced form is pulled together intoone coefficient;
2) having swept out the cx's, the shadow pricecoefficients,
the 8's, are identified;
3) the variation in SSW in the secondstep is net of its
correlation with wage. Even though SSW does notappear
in the wage equation, it is included in thewage regres-
sion to avoid inducing bias in its secondstep coefficient
estimate.
The first probit step consistently estimates the reducedform
effects of variables in the model on the probability of retirement.
These results shown in Table 2 providestrong evidence that social
security influences retirement behavior through SSW. The wealth
effect and the associated losses in SSW fromcontinuing work induce
retirement. The main empirical results are obtained from the first
probit step on which this Study could conclude. However,as de-
scribed in Section III and provided consistent estimatesare still
obtained,11 the secondstep identifies the structural parameters in
the model.
Estimates of the retirement model using imputedwages are pre—
sented in Table 3. Higher wages significantly raise theprobability
of working for persons eligible to receive benefitsaged 62 and
over. This contrasts with Quinn's (1975) result that there isTABLE 3












































































tme log of marketwages was imputed using the estimate of the





Not Eligible Reduction Full
Variables Ages 60—61 Ages 62—66 Ages65—70
DAGE*
Retired 103 288 918
Working 468 418 255
—2 x Log 10.9 98 206
Likelihood Ratio






















little wage effect. This can probably be explainedby his not
having the benefit amount in his niodel. The wage effect for 60—61
year olds is significantly positive but less than that for 62—70
year olds.
The same pattern of responses to social security wealthgiven
in Table 2 is repeated in the second point analysis. Itwas speci-
fied that SSW does not appear in thewage equation so that its coef-
ficient estimate should not change in the secondstep. However bene-
fits are based on an average of a person's earnings whichare the
product of wage and labor supply. Since the benefit formula ispro-
gressive a negative coefficient on SSW could be obtained from awage
effect working through this formula. Having SSW in thewage regres-
sion as a statistical requirement also attempts to deal with this
problem. Consequently obtaining the same strong impact of SSWagain
empirically supports the proposed life—cycle responses to social
security. The insignificant small coefficient estimate for SSW for
ineligible persons lends support to interpreting effects on eligible
persons as a causal relationship. The SSW coefficient estimates are
significantly negative for 62—70 year olds indicating again a wealth
effect inducing retirement. SSW has a greater impacton the proba-
bility of retirement for 65—70 year olds. This is the correct dynam-
ic life—cycle pattern when the rate of accumulating SSW decreasesas
it does going from actuarially reduced to full benefits.35
The wage effect has been sunarized in one significantly esti—
mated coefficient and removed from other variables' influenceson re-
tirement. Therefore using the results in Table 3, estimated retire—
ment probabilities can be calculated for different wage and benefit
amounts. This was done for married males with twelve years of school-
ing residing outside the South or a rural area with a nonworking wife
of the same age and education and having the mean value of KINC for
their respective age groups. The top half of Table 4presents the es-
timated retirement probabilities for a person aged 62years at various
wage and SSW levels. SSW has a mean value of $46,016 and a standard
deviation of $11,536 in the 62—64 age group so with slightinterpola-
tion in Table 4, an increase in SSW from one standard deviation below
to one standard deviation above the mean raises the probability of re-
tirement by 0.12 to 0.16 for wages between $3 and $7per hour.
In the bottom half of Table 4, retirement probabilities are cal-
culated for a male aged 65. Increasing SSW from one standard devia-
tion ($11,666) below the mean of $46,115 to one above raises there-
tirement probability by 0.14 to 0.25 for wages between $3 and $7per
hour. For both examples in Table 4, socIal security's effecton re-
tirement is significant.
The coefficient for LWAGE in the second probit step is the in-
verse of a', the standard error in eq. (9). The coefficient for SSW
is its coefficient in the retirement model relative to this standard
error, 6/a'. Consequently, by dividing the coefficient estimate forTABLE 4
ESTIMATED RETIRDT PROBABILITIES



























SSW by that for LWAGE,an estimate of 6 is obtained. Thisestimate is
0.15 for 62—64 year olds and 0.19for 65—70 year o].ds. By thesame
calculation, coefficients for variables inthe shadow price equation
are identified. For example, theestimate of 8, the LWAGEW coeffi-
cient, is 0.23 for 62—64 year olds and0.14 for 65—70 year olds.
The estimates for capital income'seffect on retirement change
substantially for 62—64 and 65—70year olds from Table 2 to Table 3.
As can be seen in AppendixA, KINC has a significant positivecoeffi-
cient in the wage regression
even though KINC was not specified inthe
wage equation. There is no direct causal
relationship between wages
and capital income. However,unobserved personal characteristicssuch
as ability, preferences for market work,and accumulation of private
assets and other special aptitudes andtraits that are common in
having both high wages and assetscan produce the observed relation-
ship between KINC and wage. When thiscommon effect is taken out by
imputing wages from a regression on all thevariables, KINC's coeffi-
cient is significantly
negative for 60—61 year olds. This isan ex-
pected result and serves to illustrate theadditional information
gained from the two—step procedure.
Raving KINC in the model raises aspecification issue. If cap-
ital income should enter the modelas exogenous nonlabor income, net
worth or the change in net worthbased on total accrued gains and
losses is the appropriate variable.
Actually, potential capital in-
come based on Hick's (1946,p. 172) definition of income is the rele-
vant variable. Whether or nota person realizes incomefromhis38
assets may depend on his retirement decision.Thus, it can be argued
that KINC is an endogenous variable that inducesbias in other coef-
ficient estimates. Also, as discussed in SectionIV, the life—cycle
model implies that capital income should haveno independent influence
on consumption or labor supply in any one period unless itis measur-
ing the effect of initial endowments or unexpectedchanges in net
worth. For these reasons the model was estimatedexcluding KINC and
the results were unchanged (see Appendix B whichpresents reduced—form
results obtained from repeating the first—stepprobit analysis of the
model without KINC——these results should becompared with those in
Table 2).
The only other variable having a significant effecton a mar-
ried man's labor force participation Is his wife'swage. The signifi-
cant positive coefficient estimate for LWAGEW implies thathusbands'
and wives' time are complements in householdutility. Even If LWAGEW
just indicates that a wife has worked the same Implicationcan be
drawn. The other variables in the model showno significant pattern
of retirement effects.
Private pension variables are an obvious omission In themodel.
However, holding the variables in the model——in particular,wages——
constant, potential private pension benefits are likely to beuncor—
related with social security benefits and wealth.Thus, leaving out
private pension variables would not affect the results. Privatepen-
sion formulas for Integrating benefits with socialsecurity suggest a
possible negative correlation between the two. ThisImplies that the39
results reported here underestimate social security's impacton retire—
ment.
Since AYE is an average of past earnings, unobserved laborsup-
ply determinants may be measured in AYE also. Thus AYE could be in-
cluded in the shadow price equation due to its possible correlation
with shadow price through these determinants. For the samereason,
MAX could also be included in the shadow price equation. Thissug-
gests including AYE and MAX along with LWACE in the second probit
step. The reduced—form results in Table 2 from the first probit step
remain unchanged. Again, the analysis of social security's effecton
retirement could be based and concluded on the results in Table 2.
In this study benefits depend on a person's history ofwages
and labor supply for at least the last twenty years through the cal-
culation of average monthly earnings as the benefit base. It can be
argued that a person's labor supply also depends on his entire wage
and employment experience. Consequently a person's benefit and com-
plete labor market experience cannot vary independently. Benefits
are only a complicated nonlinear transformation of the fully speci-
fied labor supply model. Any estimated effect of social security
really only measures the effects of the variables in the full model
working through the function used to define benefits. A social se—
curiy effect cannot be identified in this idealized model of labor
supply. A reasonable reply to this argument makes the point that
labor supply in any one period depends on employment experience ofa40
few years rather than twentyyears or more. The assertion being made
in this study is that because benefitsvary independently of the em—
ployinentexperience that possibly influences laborsUpply, social se-
curitycan havean independentimpact onthe decision to retire.
Thisassertion is strengthened by the fact thatpeople were covered by
social security at different times in theiremployment histories as
the program developed.
VI. Stmimary and Conclusion
This study examined the effect of socialsecurity on retirement
decisions of married men aged 60—70years. A life—cycle model of
labor supply provided the framework forspecifying the model for em-
pirical study. Market wage and shadow priceequations were the foun-
dation of analysis. Added to this standardframework for labor supply
study was social security wealth defined as thepresent value of bene-
fit income that a person would receive infull retirement. This ad-
ditional variable came from the life—cycle model'soptimality condi-
tions for labor supply and measures socialsecurity's influence on re-
tirement.
A two—step probit analysis was developed inorder to identify
the structural parameters of the model.In this way, the coefficients
in the shadow price equation could beestimated even though shadow
price is not observed. In addition, this yieldeda single coefficient
estimate swnmarizing the effect of the marketwage on retiring. The
wage effect was also cleared from the coefficient estimates for other41
variables.The variables in the retirement modelwere defined from
data containing accurate informationon persons' full potential social
Becuritybenefit whether or notany benefit payment vas actually made.
The retirement model was estimatedseparately over three age
groupsin the 60—70 year oldrange of the full sample. In the 62—64
and 65—70 year old samples of men eligible forbenefits, social secu-
rity significantly raised the probability of retirement.A two stan-
dard deviation increase in socialsecurity wealth centered on its mean
value raised the estimated retirementprobability by 0.15 for 62—64
year olds and 0.22 for 65—70 year olds. As expected,actuarial reduc-
tion lessened the impact for 62—64year olds. For 60—61 year olds
covered by social security but ineligible forreceiving benefits, the
estimated effect of social security was smallandinsignificant. This
supports the conclusion that the observed effect on the retirementof
eligible persons is a causal relationship. It alsosuggests that in-
stitutional work arrangements may make retirement therelevant margin
for altering lifetime labor supply inresponse to social security.
These results caution againstassuming that retirement age is
fixed when studying social security'sor any other retirement program's
effects on individual behavior orconsidering changes in these pro-
grams. Furthermore, being a large, important income maintenancepro-
gram, social security should minimize work disincentives.42
Notes
1. Social security benefit payments to retired workers and
their dependents and survivors amounted to $37 billion in fiscalyear
1972. Private pension programs paid out $10 billion in benefits in
1972. Financial statements on the social securityprogram can be
found in the annual reports of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old—Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance. A good
presentation of the old age, survivors, and disability insurance
(OASDI) program can be found in OASDI Digest (see U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, 1974).
The principal source which describes changes inprogram definitions
and provisions and presents annual data on covered workers,earnings,
and benefit payments is the Annual Statistical Supplement of the
Social Security Bulletin. Skolnik (1976) describes private pension
programs and estimates coverage, contributions, number of beneficiaries,
and benefit payments under these programs.
2. At present an individual can earn $3,000 in ayear without
losing any social security retirement benefit. Once the $3,000 exempt
amount is exceeded, the retirement test is administered on a monthly
basis where $1 in benefits is lost for every $2 of earned income over
$250 in a given month. It is important to note that if earnings ax—
ceed $250 in some months but yearly earnings do not exceed $3,000,
the retirement test is not applied in any month of theyear. Since
retirement is tested solely through earned income, this vechanismviii be called the "earnings test."
3. Income from accumulated privateassets is another major
source of retirement income. The effect of socialsecurity on pri—
vate capital accumulation has been the subject ofrecent theoretical
and empirical study by Feldstejn (1974,1977), Feldstein and Peliechio
(1977a), Munnel (1974, 1976), Kotlikoff (1977a, b), andBarro (1977).
4. An excellent review of thesesurveys and findings can be
found in Bixby (1976).
5. See Heckman (l974a, p. 85), Griliches(1977), and Chamber-
lain (1977).
6. A justification of this linearspecification for adding
SSW is given in Section IV.
7. Obtaining a single estimate of thewage effect by using
imputed wages is also proposed by Gronau (1977). The methodproposed
here was developed independently.
8. This derivation is carried out by Heckman(1974a&b, 1977).
Eanoch (l976a) points out the restrictive featuresof this model and
presents a general formulation.
9. See Aziz, Kilss, and Scheuren (1978) fora description and
documentation of the data.
10. As a result of this truncation, the maximum valueof AYE
is$8,040.44
11. There is a problem in using imputedwages which is that
the residual vector from ordinary leastsquares estimation of the
wage equation is not homoscedastic in small samples. Thereforea
probit specification can give inconsistent estimates. Thesample
size used here may be large enough so that theasymptotic normal dis-
tribution of the shadow price error minus thewage regression resid-
ual justifies the probit specification. Nonetheless thesecond
probit step may be misspecified which should be noted.45
APPENDIX A
WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES
Results from estimating the wage equationover the three age
groups with and without the correction for sample selectionare pre-
sented in Table A. The dependent variable is thelog of observed
hourly wage. The regressions account for at least 40percent of the
variation in logged wages with AYE and MAXadding significantly to ex-
planatory power. An average of lagged wages was expectedto be a good
predictor of current wages. The regressions were intendedto predict
individuals' potential market wages and not toserve as estimates of
the traditional wage equation. SSW ispresent not for structural
reasons, but to clear its coefficient estimate in the secondstep of
a wage effect working through the benefits formula (seep. 34 in the
text).
Eventhough M(30) is a nonlinear function of the other variables
it caused problems in getting precise estimates.Since the main ob-
jective was prediction and not estimation of the traditionalwage
equation, the logofwages were imputed based on the regressions with-
outM(30) as an explanatory variable.TABLE A




Variables Ages 60—61 Ages 62—64 Ages 65—70
M(30) —1.37 0.507 —— —0.085
(1.91) (0.623) (1.02)
MAX 0.143 —0.131 0170 0.316 0.270 0.265
(0.058) (0.387) (0.067) (0.194) (0.115) (0.131)
AYE/b3 0.189 0.172 0.217 0.285 0.227 0.202
(0.019) (0.030)(01021)(0.862)(0.029) (0.305)
0.036 0.029—0.003 —0.051 0.043 0.058
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.066) (0.043) (0.188)
KINC/104 0.236 0.3800.309 0.247 0.125 0.126
(0.079) (0.216)(0.077) (0.109) (0.063) (0.063)
SCHOOL 0.007 0.0100.011 0.014 0.027 0.026
(0.009) (0.010;)(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
SOUTH —0.058 0.043—0.003 0.006 0.066 0.070
(0.052) (0.150) (0.057) (0.058) (0.081) (0.094)
RURAL -0.024 —0.015—0.121 —0.078 —0.150-0.138
(0.049) (0.051)(0.060) (0.080) (0.087) (0.168)
RACE 0.121 0.283 0.001 —0.123 0.081 0.087
(0.103) (0.247) 0.109 (0.188) (0.150) (0.167)
AGEW —0.002 —0.001—0.002 —0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.004)(0.048)(0.004)(0.005)0.007 0.008
LWAGEW —0.045 —0.020—0.058 —0.002 —0.035 —0.044
(0.023) (0.042)(0.025) (0.074) 0.036 (0.118)
SCHOOLW 0.017 0.002 0.010 0.009 —0.003 —0.003

















R2 0.413 0.414 0.404 0.405 0.471 0.471
N 528 548 336
*DAGE Coefficient Estimates (standard errors):
Ages 60—61: D610.022 (0.043)
with M(J0): D61 —0.021 (0.073)
Ages 62—64: D63 —0.033 (0.059)D64 —0.059 (0.061)
with M(J0): D63 —0.068 (0.074)D64 —0.117 (0.094)
Ages 65—70: D66 —0.003 (0.101)D67 —0.101 (0.112)
D68 —0.154 (0.123)D69 —0.005 (0.151
D700.098 (0.161)
withN(30): D660.002 (0.115)D67 —0.097 (0.129)
D68—0.141 (0.194)D69 —0.002 (0.153)
D700. 098 (0. 161)APPENDIX B









MAX 0.594 0.645 0.159
(0.198) (0.158) (0.157)




SCHOOL —0.009 0.007 0.016
(0.025) (0.020) (0.017)
SOUTH —0.196 0.026 —0.056
(0.148) (0.115) (0.099)
RURAL —0.022 0.170 —0.183
(0.140) (0.117) (0.104)
RACE —0.329 —0.470 —0.106
(0.311) (0.224) (0.198)
AGEW —0.004 —0.011 0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
LVAGEW —0.048 0.224 0.163
(0.066) (0.054) (0.049)
SCHOOLW —0.012 —0.005 0.011
(0.029) (0.021) (0.019)
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*DAGE Coefficient Estimates (standard errors):
Ages 60—61: D61 0.083 (0.127)
Ages 62—64:D63—0.118(0.126)D64—0.219(0.125)
Ages 65—70: D66 —0.086 (0.139)D67 —0.101 (0.146)
D68 —0.209 (0.155)D69 —0.058 (0.159)
D70 —0.018 (0.170)APPENDIX C










60 2 5 12 13 248
61 5 7 9 8 219
62 6 10 14 7 158
63 9 8 5 10 155
64 3 8 3 14 138
65 10 12 14 7 83
66 3 10 0 3 53
67 7 2 3 5 35
68 2 5 4 0 31
69 2 3 1 1 18
70 0 2 3 2 1551
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